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ABSTRACT

The Tracking and Data Relay Satellite System (TDRSS) is a multi-satellite
operational system which both uses the Space Transportation System (STS) as a
launch vehicle and provides key tracking and data communications services to
STS flights. Since the Tracking and Data Relay Satellite (TDRS) was
originally designed for an Expendable Launch Vehicle (ELV) launch, the STS
requirements provided many difficult challenges both technically and
programmatically. The time span of the TDRS development was roughly in the
same time span as the development of STS operations, and, being one of the
first STS payloads, the TDRS and the STS matured together, pioneering many of
the features incorporated into this launch system today.
This paper describes the history of the TDRS and STS relationship, the unique
considerations which were required of the TDRS Program, and the design
drivers which were imposed on the TDRS as the program matured and
subsequently as the STS was re-evaluated as a consequence of the Challenger
accident. The in-advance preparations and coordination is detailed as are
the pre-launch and launch activities required to fly on an Orbiter. The
advantages as well as disadvantages of flying on a manned launch vehicle are
detailed, and the paper ends with advice and recommendations based on lessons
learned. It is hoped that this paper will give some insight into how
yesterday's vision of a reusable launch vehicle evolved into today's
operational launch system, and how yesterday's vision of a space-based
Tracking and Data Relay System has replaced the Ground Spaceflight Tracking
and Data Network (GSTDN) Stations, providing markedly improved data rates and
orbital coverage for today's users including the STS.
INTRODUCTION

The TDRSS provides the primary means that NASA has to communicate with and
gather data from most of its low Earth orbiting missions. This includes the
great observatories, Hubble Space Telescope (HST), Gamma Ray Observatory
(GRO) and Upper Atmosphere Research Satellite (UARS), as well as the STS,
Landsat and the Cosmic Background Explorer (COBE). Indeed, the TDRSS is an
integral part of most of NASA's near-Earth missions now and for the
foreseeable future. The Earth Observing System (EOS) and Space Station
Freedom missions will rely on TDRSS for the bulk of their two-way
communications and orbital tracking needs.
The TDRSS is a series of geosynchronous satellites maintained and operated by
a ground station located at White Sands, New Mexico. These satellites relay
data from the White Sands Ground Terminal (WSGT) to user spacecraft. Since
the TDRS's are in a geosynchronous orbit, they maintain constant contact with
the ground station and have direct line-of-sight communication with user
spacecraft throughout most of their orbit. These communications are
implemented through either one of the two TDRS Single Access Antennas, which
are steered in the direction of a user, or by using the Multiple Access array
which electrically forms a beam to a user. The Single Access system is
operated at either K-Band or S-Band while the Multiple Access system is
restricted to S-Band only. Another vital part of the operational TDRSS is
the Network Control Center (NCC) at the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC).
The NCC is responsible for scheduling the services provided by the TDRSS and
for providing a two-way data and operations interface to the TDRSS users.
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The history of the TDRSS goes back to the early 1970's when the
communications and data gathering services for low-Earth orbit missions were
provided by a world-wide network of ground stations which would track user
spacecraft as they went overhead in their orbits. In the early days of NASA,
these ground stations, which provided low data rate transmission capability
over about 15% of a typical users orbit, were adequate in meeting user needs.
As data transmission rates grew substantially and requirements for extended
contact times with users also grew, the existing network of ground stations
was no longer up to the task. Additionally, since these ground stations were
necessarily located in sovereign foreign countries, political and economic
problems in supporting and maintaining these stations were exponentially
increasing. Today, the TDRSS provides coverage of about 85% of a typical
users orbit at data transmission rates exceeding 300 Mbps. In fact, each
TORS has the capability of transmitting the data equivalent of a 24-volume
encyclopedia in less than six seconds. The original contract for the TORS
required the spacecraft to be designed to support a dual role. In addition
to the TDRSS mission, a commercial K-Band and C-Band communications
capability was required. However, due to programmatic considerations, the
commercial mission was terminated prior to the launch of the first TDRS.
Presently, the TDRSS on-orbit constellation consists of five spacecraft. The
F-l was launched in 1983 and is about to be retired from general TDRSS
service and will be dedicated to special support for the GRO mission. In
this capacity, the F-l will be moved out of view of the WSGT and will be
operated remotely through its own unique and dedicated mini-terminal located
in Australia. The F-4 and F-5 Spacecraft, launched in 1989 and 1991,
respectively, are presently carrying the bulk of the TDRSS workload and are
augmented on occasion by the F-3. The F-3 Spacecraft, launched in 1988, is
only partially operational due to an on-orbit failure of one of the high data
rate K-Band links. The F-6 Spacecraft, which was just launched in January of
this year, is being stored on-orbit as a ready reserve spacecraft should
something happen to either F-4 or F-5. These spacecraft were all built for
NASA by TRW of Redondo Beach, California.
The TDRSS ground station located in White Sands, New Mexico, is operated and
maintained by GTE and provides the functions of controlling the on-orbit
spacecraft as well as relaying data to and from user control centers to
on-orbit user spacecraft. The ground station is operated 24 hours a day, 365
days a year. A contingent of about 300 persons, 5 civil servants and 295
contractor personnel working for GTE, Bendix and TRW, man the station to
maintain operations. Presently, the station operates the system with an
efficiency in excess of 99%. That is, more than 99% of user requests for
services which have been accepted by the NCC scheduling system, are actually
provided to the user. Scheduling of TDRSS service to users is usually done
weeks in advance although some limited amounts of quickly scheduled service,
to accommodate user spacecraft emergency needs, are also available.
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Since the TORS was originally designed to fly on an ELV, minimal attention
was initially paid to the stringent man-rated safety requirements. After
signing on with the STS, we found that safety policy and requirements of the
STS were being constantly revised, making necessary significant and expensive
design changes to spacecraft already being built. Today, the requirements
are well developed and quite firm so that new users know up front what their
safety design goals are. In particular, in the original design, the TORS
Spacecraft ordnance firing circuitry did not have the necessary two-fault
tolerant safety inhibits as required by STS safety considerations. This
problem required extensive redesign of TORS circuitry, permeated through
several fixed-price contracts and subcontracts and required physical rework
of much of the in-process hardware. Integrated Test Procedures, now called
Operations and Maintenance Instructions (OMI's), had to be developed without
any existing standards for content or format; in addition, basic test
philosophy was still evolving. Customer stand-alone test procedures which
were necessary to support the OMI's needed to be written but could not
because the format of the OMI, which the stand-alone test procedure
interfaced with was not defined. On F-l/STS-6, the procedures were written
over and over again. Additionally, many deviations were written during the
actual launch Integration and Test flow. Today, very few procedural changes
occur.
Early on in the program for F-l, extensive effort was required in order to
convince the management of both the launch vehicles and the TORS that, prior
to launch, an end-to-end test was required to verify that the spacecraft and
the various ground terminals and networks played together. It was argued
that this type of testing was unnecessary and too costly. It was finally
agreed that the community would support the tests providing that the user pay
the costs. Today, no one would think of launching a primary spacecraft
without end-to-end tests.
F-l was the first payload to be processed through the Vertical Processing
Facility (VPF) and launch pad. The VPF facilities were in fairly good shape,
the operations well planned, and the clean room cleanliness met the user
requirements. The launch pad and specifically the Payload Changeout Room
(PCR), which is part of the Rotating Support Structure (RSS), required
extensive redesign in order to maintain cleanliness specifications after F-l
was launched. During the time when F-l was on the Pad, a severe storm passed
through. The movement of the tower was not In sync with the movement of the
Orbiter; as a result, seals designed to maintain a positive pressure within
the PCR did not do their job. Moisture and particulate matter entered the
PCR and contaminated the TORS. TORS was cleaned on the Pad and subsequently
launched. Today, after extensive modifications to the PCR and the
implementation of good clean room procedures, the PCR is really an excellent
clean room.
There were a lot of firsts with the launch of the TORS:
o

The first to use the VPF, particularly the transfer of a 47,000 pound
payload into the transportation canister.
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o

The first to run end-to-end tests, the first test revealed such
severe problems with the supporting communications network elements
that, had we launched without the end-to-end test, there would have
been serious on-orbit problems communicating with the spacecraft
through the launch vehicle communications links.

o

The first to move to the launch pad in a canister, be erected at the
PCR, transferred into the PCR and subsequently into the Orbiter cargo
bay. These operations were pretested by KSC using a dummy load.
However, when the 47,000 pound load of the TDRS/IUS was transferred
into the Payload Ground Handling Mechanism (PGHM), it revealed
misalignments in the PGHH which caused the load to shift several
inches. This caused some major excitement.

o

F-l was the first spacecraft to be fueled in the PCR at the Pad.

o

F-2 was the first spacecraft to experience a flight hardware problem
on the Pad that would necessitate removing the spacecraft from the
Pad for repair. No one had ever backed out of a launch flow before;
consequently, procedures to accomplish the tasks were either not
prepared or were not in a usable state. Essentially the entire
forward going flow from the VPF to the Pad had to be reversed.
Procedures were written under severe pressure because there was
another payload waiting in the wings and KSC needed to clear the Pad.
The spacecraft had to be defueled on the Pad.
With the tanks still wet with a small quantity of residual fuel,
the payload was removed from the PCR and moved to the VPF.
Once in the VPF work stands, the TORS was demated from the IUS
and transported to an explosive/safe area where considerable
disassembly of the spacecraft was required to accomplish the
repair.
Once repaired, the spacecraft was stored under purge for more
than six months waiting to re-enter the launch flow. The
React ion Control System was stored with minor residual fuel in
the system during the entire time.

After learning all of the pioneering lessons before and during the F-l launch
and the education which was obtained as a result of the F-2 stand-down,
things have gone very well from the launch integration standpoint. Presently
F-3, F-4, F-5 and F-6 have all been launched using techniques and procedures
largely developed for the F-l and original F-2 efforts. (After the original
F-2 stand-down, the F-2 came back and went through a smooth launch
re-integration flow. Unfortunately, that spacecraft was subsequently lost in
the Challenger accident.)
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DESIGN DRIVERS

As a launch system, the STS offers a rather benign ride to its customers
imposing relatively mild structural and thermal engineering requirements.
However, since it is a man-rated system, the safety requirements on the
design and implementation of a user spacecraft are enormous and, as a result,
are significant cost drivers. For the TORS, when the initial contractual
launch vehicle was switched from an ELV to the STS, we took on some major
upgrade activities within several spacecraft subsystems. The TORS pressure
vessels (containing hydrazine at about 340 Ibs/square inch pressure) although
designed with ample margin for an ELV launch, needed to be proof-tested and,
in one case, needed to be subjected to an ultimate burst test to adequately
demonstrate their man-rated qualification. The commanding system and its
operations especially in the way that on-board ordnance commands were
processed, had to be re-designed. All systems which could have an impact on
STS safety must be two-fault tolerant. On the TORS, certain ordnance and
propulsion subsystem commands are hardware inhibited during the time that the
TORS is on-board the STS. While in the STS payload bay, inadvertent radio
frequency radiation, especially since it may impact ordnance safety, is also
of great concern. The hydrazine fueling, always a high profile safety
operation, now came under new scrutiny because of the planned fueling on the
launch pad. Fracture control was imposed on every one of the structural
members of the spacecraft, its appendages and the launch vehicle adapter.
Fracture control is a process whereby each individual part on each individual
flight spacecraft is subject to analysis, testing, or a combination thereof
to verify that it was manufactured in a way which will not allow it to fail
under launch or launch abort loads. (For the TORS launch on the STS, the
abort or return from orbit loads are the driving condition. These loads are
significantly greater than the predicted launch loads.) All of these items
collectively had a huge impact on TORS schedules and costs.
PREPARATIONS AND COORDINATION

Perhaps the greatest lesson learned from the many TDRS launches on the STS is
the need for early coordination through preparation and a continued dialogue
between all responsible entities. As in virtually all other complex
technical and programmatic matters, the first definitions of TDRS/IUS/STS
interface problems and their early solutions were found to be inadequate.
Early understandings developed into misunderstandings which required large
expenditures of resources and energy to resolve. Only tight coordination and
constant preparations allowed the eventual resolution of all problems prior
to the first launch. Our present method of preparation and coordination is
to designate specific interfaces within the three organizations and maintain
life in those interfaces through scheduled meetings on a semi-annual basis
even when launch is not imminent. When we get within nine months or so of a
launch, interface meetings or teleconferences are held on a monthly basis
even when major problems do not exist. If major concerns develop, daily
teleconferences and meetings can be common.
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PRE-LAUNCH ACTIVITY

The pre-launch activity for a TDRS starts with the arrival of the spacecraft
via a C-5A aircraft 90 days prior to the scheduled launch date. Upon
arrival, the spacecraft is set up in the VPF where it receives a mechanical
look-over and is then electrically connected to its test set. Those
spacecraft subsystems which are normally activated during the actual launch
are then checked out to verify their continued readiness. Upon a complete
checkout of those subsystems (the TDRS Communications Payload cannot be
activated in the launch configuration and remains off until the spacecraft
has been deployed on orbit) the spacecraft is mechanically and then
electrically mated to the IUS. This activity also takes place in the VPF.
After mating IUS/TDRS interface testing is performed with both the TDRS and
the IUS in nearly launch-ready configuration, tests of data flows are made to
the controlling centers of each system and a final review to determine
readiness to proceed is also held. After the TDRS/IUS combination is tested,
the entire stack, at this point weighing in at nearly 47,000 Ibs., is
transported vertically to the launch pad. At the Pad, the stack is lifted to
the PCR and, when the Orbiter is moved to the launch pad, the TDRS/IUS
combination is placed into the payload bay of the Orbiter. Hydrazine
fueling, a final pre-launch battery reconditioning, and trickle charging are
done on the Pad.
When mechanically and electrically installed in the payload bay of the
Orbiter, a series of end-to-end tests involving the STS, the IUS, and the
TDRS is performed. The controlling centers of each system are brought on
line and all launch-required systems are checked out. This portion of the
pre-launch activity can bring about unwelcome surprises even with good
pre-coordination. Generally on the STS, two or more payloads can be
co-manifested and at this point in the launch flow these payloads start
coming together for the first time. Since the processing is done with the
payloads and the STS in a vertical attitude, those payloads closest to the
STS cabin will be physically directly above the other payloads in the PCR.
This can bring about many concerns such as the accidental dropping of
material or tools. For the TDRS, we have insisted upon and received
custom-manufactured debris shields which are affixed directly above the
delicate TDRS Spacecraft and its stowed appendages and protect the TDRS from
activities physically above the spacecraft.
LAUNCH ACTIVITY

The TDRS launch window starts In the morning hours and is limited to be less
than three hours in length. The morning constraint is levied by a
combination of STS preference (the transatlantic abort landing sites are in
daylight) and thermal constraints of the TDRS (the sun look angles post
launch and during deployment from the STS). The length of the window is
limited by the STS crew-on-back time. (The launch crew is seated but is
lying on their backs due to the vertical take-off position of the Orbiter.)
For the TDRS launch, the STS follows a nominal orbit with an inclination of
28 . Although from lift-off, the communications are provided through two
ground stations, Merritt Island Launch Area (MILA) and Bermuda, the TDRS soon
takes over and provides real-time contact with the Orbiter as it goes over
the Atlantic. The data from the IUS and the TDRS being launched that day is
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combined with STS telemetry and relayed to the Johnson Space Center (JSC) via
the TDRSS network. From JSC, the data is stripped and shipped to the various
control centers. The IUS data goes to the Consolidated Space Test Center in
Sunnyvale, California, and the TORS data ends up at the WSGT in New Mexico
and at the Back-up Project Operations Control Center at the spacecraft
manufacturers plant in Redondo Beach, California. On a nominal launch, the
TORS data which gives a continuous look at the state of health and
performance of those subsystems which are activated for launch, is
continuously relayed to the WSGT and monitored. A sophisticated system
designed to support mainly the TORS launch is used to monitor, plot, compare
and archive all spacecraft data. System and subsystem experts are
responsible for viewing this data in real-time and reporting go/no-go or
abnormal conditions to Project Managers. A major advantage of launching on
the STS is the ability to meaningfully check the performance of the
spacecraft being launched and return a spacecraft without placing it in orbit
should a failure develop or even possibly correct a problem, on-orbit but
prior to deployment, which might have developed during launch.
Once the STS has achieved a successful low-Earth orbit, and all of the TORS
and IUS systems have been checked and are nominal, the tilt table to which
the TDRS/IUS is attached is tilted to 58° and the TDRS/IUS is released from
the Orbiter. About one orbit later, after the Orbiter has backed away to a
safe distance and the IUS has aligned itself to the proper altitude, the
first stage of the IUS, a solid rocket motor, ignites and the TORS is on its
way to a geosynchronous orbit. The IUS thrusts for less than three minutes.
The coast to a geosynchronous apogee then takes a little more than five
hours. During this time the IUS performs a slow roll to help maintain
thermal equilibrium. During this time, a preprogrammed IUS maneuver called a
dipout is also performed five times at nearly equally spaced intervals. The
dipouts re-orient the TDRS to point the TDRS communications antenna back
towards Earth just in case commands are needed to be sent to perhaps
reconfigure the TDRS. (TDRS telemetry is continuously sent down by being
multiplexed on the IUS telemetry link.)
Upon reaching the proper altitude, the IUS second stage fires to circularize
and place the spacecraft into the intended orbit. After holding on to the
TDRS for a few more minutes to stabilize the spacecraft through the critical
deployments of the solar arrays, the IUS second stage separates and the TDRS
is on its own. Several additional complex deployments are then performed and
the spacecraft is ready for on-orbit checkout and eventual operations,
ADVICE AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1.

Take time to thoroughly understand STS operations and especially
safety requirements.

2.

Start and maintain interface activities as soon as it is known that
the STS will be the launch vehicle.

3.

Six months to a year prior to the actual launch date, establish a
semi full-time presence or representation at KSC. GSFC has
established a permanent office at KSC to perform this function for
its launches.

4.

Interface not only with STS but with co-manifested payloads.
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